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INTRODUCTION
That useful alterations will be suggested by experi-
ence, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, there-
fore, that a mode for introducing them should be
provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems
to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards
equally against that extreme facility, which would render
the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty,
which might perpetuate its discovered faults. '
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 275 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (empha-
sis added).
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To remain vital, a political institution should adapt to emerging cir-
cumstances while avoiding changes that are likely to be anachronistic. 2
Framers such as James Madison understood this tension and built a de-
gree of semi-permanence into the American political system.3 A review
of the amendment procedures contained in Article V demonstrates the
laboriousness of modifying the United States Constitution.4 Specifically,
Article V provides no direct method for citizen involvement in the
amendment process and instead requires a two-thirds vote of both houses
of Congress 5 in addition to ratification by three-quarters of state
legislatures. 6
The framers of many American state constitutions also worried
about questions of institutional robustness. 7 At the same time, concern
2 A host of public-choice scholars, most notably 1986 Nobelist James M. Buchanan, Jr.,
devote substantial attention to questions of constitutional choice and change. See, e.g., James
M. Buchanan, The Domain of Constitutional Economics, I CONST. POL. ECON. 1, 1-2 (1990)
(describing how the constitutional political economy research program focuses on how indi-
viduals and groups impose constraints upon future actions while still allowing those con-
straints to adapt); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 3-4 (1962) (analyzing constitutional
economics as a study of choice among various constraints). Randall G. Holcombe, a disciple
of Buchanan, describes the enterprise quite precisely: "An ideal constitution would constrain
the government to prevent it from engaging in inefficient activities, but would not be so con-
straining as to prevent it from pursuing efficient activities. The concept is clear in theory, but
is one of the practical challenges of constitutional design." Randall G. Holcombe, Constitu-
tions as Constraints: A Case Study of Three American Constitutions, 2 CONST. POL. ECON.
303, 326 (1991). Literature in a variety of academic fields focuses on examining the nature of
as well as the conditions producing institutional change. See, e.g., James G. March, Explora-
tion and Exploitation in Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. Sc. 71, 71-72 (1991) (asserting that
organizations must find a balance between searching for new and innovative practices and
exploiting and manipulating the best existing practices of an organization). The work of 1993
Nobelist Douglass C. North also addresses the relationship between institutional change and
economic performance. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990).
3 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V.
4 See U.S. CONST. art. V. Political Scientist Donald Lutz characterizes the U.S. Consti-
tution as one of the most difficult constitutions in the world to amend. See Donald S. Lutz,
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 265 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
Although the U.S. Constitution also provides for the possibility of a constitutional convention,
this process has never been undertaken at any point over the past two centuries. Professor
Levinson has consistently called for consideration of a constitutional convention to remedy the
document's structural deficiencies. For a recent discussion on the subject, see Sanford Levin-
son, The Democratic Deficit in America, I HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. (Online) (Dec. 4, 2006),
http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/11/levinson 0l .htmi.
5 U.S. CONST. art. V. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (rea-
soning that two-thirds of the house members present, not two-thirds of overall membership,
was necessary to propose a constitutional amendment).
6 U.S. CONST. art. V.
7 JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 29-63 (2006).
Professor Dinan's book provides a very rich account of the debates over amendment and revi-
sion procedures during the framing of both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions. For
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about the unknown and a general distrust of institutional permanence led
a number of state constitutional framers to argue for a relatively unre-
strictive amendment process. 8 As a result of such efforts, American state
constitutions generally feature less restrictive amendment processes than
is present at the federal level. 9 Many states provide multiple avenues to
constitutional change and permit extensive citizen involvement in the
constitutional amendment process.' 0 In virtually every state, it is not
even possible to amend or revise a constitution without first submitting it
to the public for electoral consent.1"
States vary widely in their amendment processes. 12 This lack of
uniformity suggests that at least some states could improve their political
institutions by converging upon the practices of neighboring jurisdic-
tions. This article proceeds with an eye toward Madison's goal of opti-
mizing the method of institutional modification' 3 by considering the
process of American state constitutional change-a process increasingly
dominated by the most "direct" forms of direct democracy. 14
Part I of this article briefly describes both the theoretical and histori-
cal origins of American direct democracy. It then completely categorizes
the set of processes that together comprise the domain of direct demo-
cratic lawmaking vehicles. These vehicles include both "direct" and "in-
direct" methods as well as mechanisms that provide for the modification
example, consider William Meredith, a Pennsylvania state legislator who argued in favor of a
restrictive amendment process: "Change in the fundamental law ought not to be made on
trivial or light grounds. And while the right was renewed to the people to alter their constitu-
tion, the attainment of that object ought not to be rendered too easy, and accomplishable by
mere party cries." Id. at 40 (quoting 12 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 236-37 (1837)).
8 See id. Professor Dinan carefully documents how a variety of state constitutional con-
vention participants supported their respective positions on constitutional revision and amend-
ment processes. For example, he quotes William Steele, a member of the Indiana
Constitutional Convention who noted:
[S]hall we say that we have arrived at the farthest point in the progress of improve-
ment-that no further advance can be made-that we have attained perfection-that
there will hereafter be no necessity for alteration-that we are to remain stationary
and seek no further advance in the science of government?
Id. at 35 (quoting REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA (1850)).
9 Id. at 29.
10 See Figure 1.1 infra Part I.
11 For a brief but clear mention of Delaware's unique status, see Gerald Benjamin, Con-
stitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY 177, 185 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (noting "[I]n Delaware no
popular ratification is required to amend the state constitution.").
12 See infra Parts I, 1I.
13 See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 1, at 275.
14 As described in Part I infra, the term "direct democracy" casts a broad definitional net
and encompasses any process that calls for citizen involvement. The most "direct" forms of
direct democracy are the Direct Constitutional and Direct Statutory Initiatives because these
processes provide no role for legislative or executive actors.
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of both statutory and constitutional law. Further, this Part uses these
classifications to describe current trends in citizen-involved lawmaking.
Prior research demonstrates an overall increase in the use of direct
democratic processes. This article, however, breaks new ground by us-
ing nearly three decades of empirical data collected specifically for use
in this analysis.' 5 These data indicate that the Direct Constitutional Initi-
ative (DCI) is driving this increase within jurisdictions that feature this
lawmaking process. In other words, at least within the sixteen DCI
states, the direct-democracy phenomenon should be best understood as
constitutional in nature.16
Part II of the article reviews institutional rules of the relevant juris-
dictions through a comparative analysis of the requirements for the pro-
posal and ratification of direct constitutional and statutory changes. It
concludes that the institutional rules displayed in DCI jurisdictions in-
centivize individuals and groups to select this approach when seeking a
substantive policy change.
Part III evaluates the increased use of the Direct Constitutional Initi-
ative through a comprehensive review of the legal literature that consid-
ers judicial review of direct democracy. This literature suggests that
judicial officials may be unwilling or unable to police direct democracy,
and, in particular, constitutional direct democracy. Drawing upon a host
of interdisciplinary scholarship, Part III then presents critiques of not
only constitutional change 17 but also of plebiscite lawmaking.
15 Data for the article are the results of direct democratic processes collected from a
variety of sources and reflect a complete collection of all statewide measures in each of the
fifty American states from 1977 to 2006. As presented herein, our data display the total num-
ber of measures of each type that reached the ballot. We tallied the passage rate for the
respective periods among those that made it to the ballot. Our collection process included the
search and crosscheck of data from the National Conference of State Legislatures' ballot mea-
sures database and the University of Southern California Initiative and Referendum Institute.
To collect any missing data, as well as to audit our data, we contacted the secretaries of state of
the applicable states, as well as other local sources. Thank you to all individuals who assisted
us in the data-collection effort.
16 In his classic book reviewing the period from 1950-1980, David Magelby noted the
increased appeal and success of statutory processes. See DAVID B. MAGELBY, DIRECT LEGIS-
LATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 72 (1984). However, as a
follow up to Magelby's work, the data collected for this article are used to analyze the thirty-
year period from 1977 to 2006. It is worth noting that only a few scholars emphasize the
increasing constitutional nature of direct democracy. While not exclusively focused on the
exact period of our inquiry, consider Professor G. Alan Tarr, one of the world's foremost
experts on sub-national constitutions, who notes: "From 1950 to 1974, states adopted only 279
initiatives, but in the succeeding twenty-five years they adopted 929." See G. Alan Tarr, For
the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional Tradition, in DEMOCRACY: How
Dnacr?: VIEws FROM THE FOUNDING ERA AND THE POLLING ERA 87, 87 (Elliott Abrams ed.,
2002).
17 As an example of the broader point, consider the view of Fourth Circuit Judge J.
Harvey Wilkinson I1. Discussing proposed federal and state constitutional amendments pur-
porting to ban gay marriage, he notes, "[O]rdinary legislation-not constitutional amend-
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This article does not directly consider substantive outputs of consti-
tutional direct democracy. Instead, it focuses upon a set of procedural
elements that would, at a minimum, help the DCI embrace robustly sup-
ported proposals. To do this, it surveys the nation for a set of best direct
democratic practices that together may yield an optimal method of con-
stitutional modification. While the Conclusion ultimately rejects com-
plete convergence18 by all jurisdictions, it does support a process that
takes state constitutions seriously and treats them as the supreme level of
American state law.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:
THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
A. CLASSIFYING THE DOMAIN OF AMERICAN DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The historical origin of direct democracy in America is inextricably
tied to the political reform movements of the Progressive Era. 19 Driven
by the perception the political marketplace was captured by powerful
entrenched interests, progressives working in the early twentieth century
sought mechanisms to combat both legislative capture and the shirking of
politicians. 20 Progressives advocated adopting provisions that allowed
ments-should express the community's view . . . the more passionate an issue, the less
justification there often is for constitutionalizing it." He concludes with a simple statement:
"Leave constitutions alone." J. Harvie Wilkinson, Hands Off Constitutions; This Isn't the Way
to Ban Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2006, at A19; see also J. Harvie Wilkinson,
Gay Rights and American Constitutionalism: What's a Constitution For?, 56 Duke L.J. 545
(2006).
18 Building upon the work of Jenna Bednar, Part IV infra supports an "optimal level of
convergence" such that search and the benefits of convergence as jointly maximized. For an
extended discussion see JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION (forthcoming 2008).
19 See THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFEREN-
DUM AND RECALL 8 (1989); STEVEN PioTr, GIVING VOTERS A CHOICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 1-15 (2003); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 150-53 (2000); Patrick L. Baude, A Comment on the Evolution of Di-
rect Democracy in Western State Constitutions, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 343 (1998); Richard Collins
& Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures that Do and Don't Work, 66
Colo. L. Rev. 47, 54 (1995) ("[Mlost states that allow the initiative adopted it during the
Progressive Era. Beginning with South Dakota, nineteen states authorized state-wide initia-
tives between 1898 and 1918.").
20 The principal-agent relationship is the mechanism organizations typically employ to
delegate responsibility to individuals charged to exercise decisional authority on its behalf.
The drive for institutional optimization through delegation, however, must be tempered by a
downside risk of suboptimal agent behavior. Namely, delegation and reliance upon agents
create the conditions for "shirking" whereby agents advance their own goals rather than the
policy preferences of the principals they serve. While the electoral marketplace is designed to
oversee political agents, the efficacy of oversight in the political marketplace, however, is far
from clear. See, e.g., JOHN MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW (2004); see also James
A. Gardner, Voting and Elections, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY 145, 169 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert Williams eds., 2006) ("Reformers have generally
claimed only that representative democracy periodically becomes perverted by legislative in-
competence or corruption, and that direct democracy provides a needed corrective.").
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citizens to modify statutory or constitutional law. 2' Thus, many state
constitutions amended or adopted during this era provide for a variety of
forms of direct democracy, with a large number of these specific mecha-
nisms for direct statutory or constitutional lawmaking persisting into the
present era. 22
Virtually every single American state features some form of direct
democracy. 23 However, both the nature and extent of citizen involve-
ment permitted within each state is widely divergent. Some states pro-
vide multiple avenues through which citizens can participate directly,
while other states feature far fewer mechanisms. Figure 1.1 below high-
lights the primary difference in approaches-between referenda and ini-
tiatives-and differentiates the landscape into seven discrete categories
(A-G) which taken together comprise the domain of American Direct
Democracy.
21 See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 19; DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BAL-
LOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1991); DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED
By INITIATIVE 19-26 (2004); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 19.
22 Collins & Oesterle, supra note 19 and accompanying text. Concern about wayward
political agents as well as the effectiveness of this electoral auditing mechanism typically pro-
duces calls for an alternative, more direct political process. Proponents typically argue the
most effective manner to obtain compliance from political agents is to provide a mechanism
which threatens to impose a majority policy if political agents shirk. For both an empirical and
a game-theoretic analysis of the indirect effects of the initiative, see Elisabeth Gerber, Legisla-
tive Response to the Threat of the Popular Initiative, 40 AMER. J. OF POL. Scl. 99 (1996).
Experience with the practice of American direct democracy may be at odds with the theoretical
claims advanced by its populist advocates. See, e.g., RICHARD ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELU-
SIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA (2002); ELISABETH GERBER, THE POPULIST PARA-
DOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECr LEGISLATION (1999); Todd
Donovan et al., Political Consultants and the Initiative Industrial Complex, in DANGEROUS
DEMOCRACY? 101 (Larry Sabato et al. eds. 2001); Richard Ellis, Signature Gathering in the
Initiative Process: How Democratic Is It?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 35 (2003); Arne Leonard, In
Search of the Deliberative Initiative: A Proposal for a New Method of Constitutional Change,
69 TEMP. L. REV. 1203 (1996).
23 The article adopts a broad definition of direct democracy; one that includes any mech-
anism that solicits the direct input of the citizenry. While many states feature multiple avenues
for citizen involvement, virtually every jurisdiction in the United States embraces as a method
of institutional change the Constitutional Legislative Referendum. Delaware reflects a notable
exception to this trend as it does not provide for the Constitutional Legislative Referendum.
See DEL. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1-5.
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Figure 1.1: The Domain of American Direct Democracy 24
Referendum Initiative
Process Process
PoptittiLegislativeon tton al
Initiative Initiative
Pplr Siatutoty Cositutino irc Indi' iet Indirec
Referndtum Legislative gsave Sauoy Stautory Constitutional ntttoa
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BEF G
Working from left to right, Figure 1.1 begins by subdividing the
referendum process into those measures referred to the legislature by the
people and those measures that authorize the legislature to transfer a de-
cision directly to the citizenry. The former practice, often called the Pop-
ular Referendum [A], 25 allows individuals and groups who collect a
sufficient number of signatures to place already enacted legislation
before voters for their approval. The Legislative Referendum also lies on
the indirect end of the direct democratic spectrum, as it is the legislature
and not the citizenry who determines which set of policy offerings will
be placed upon the electoral ballot. Depending upon the nature of policy
change in question, Legislative Referendum has two distinct forms. The
Statutory Legislative Referendum [B], a process available in twenty-
three states, 26 or the Constitutional Legislative Referendum [C], is a pro-
cess available in virtually every state.27 The key distinction between
each form is the level of substantive state law.
24 For definitions of each of these terms [A-G], see Figure 1.2 infra.
25 The twenty-four states allow for the Popular Referendum are Alaska, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT
UNIV. S. CAL., STATE I & R, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide-i&r.htm (last visited Feb.
16, 2008).
26 The twenty-three states featuring the Statutory Legislative Referendum are Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington. Id.
27 See ALA. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 284, 287; ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST.
art. XXI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4; COLO. CONST. art.
XIX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. XII; FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 5; GA.CONST. art. X, § 1, paras.
1-3; HAW. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1, 3; IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2;
IND. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. X, § I; KAN. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; Ky. CONST.
§ 256; LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. X, § 4; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; MASS.
CONST. amend, art. XLVIII, part IV, §§ 1-5, part V, §§ 1, 2; MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 1;
MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. XV, § 273; Mo. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2(a), 2(b);
MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 8; NEB, CONST. art. XVI, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; N.H.
CONST. part 2, art. 100, § a; N.J. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 6; N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; N.Y.
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Another avenue through which citizens can participate directly is
the initiative. In an initiative, "citizens, collecting signatures on a peti-
tion, place advisory questions, memorials, statutes or constitutional
amendments on the ballot for the citizens to adopt or reject." 28 The initi-
ative processes subdivides along the division between statutory and con-
stitutional change, and also reflects the extent of the state legislature's
involvement in the process. As shown in Figure 1.1, fourteen states fea-
ture the Direct Statutory Initiative [D]29 while sixteen provide for the
Direct Constitutional Initiative [F]. 30 They are "direct," as they contem-
plate no involvement by the executive or members of the legislature.
Instead, they merely require a citizen or interest group to collect the re-
quired threshold number of signatures. The Direct Constitutional Initia-
tive and Direct Statutory Initiative are far more prevalent than their
indirect counterparts and are the most "direct" forms of direct
democracy.
The Indirect Statutory Initiative [E] 31 and Indirect Constitutional In-
itiative [G] 32 similarly provide for signature collection but, by contrast,
allow for legislative consideration of a given policy offering prior to its
placement upon the electoral ballot. Nine states feature the former pro-
cess while only two jurisdictions feature the Indirect Constitution making
mechanism.
CONST. art. XIX, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 45; OHIO CONST. art.
XVI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV, § 1; OR. CONST art. IV, § 1, art. XVII, §§ 1, 2; PA.
CONST. art. XI, § 1; R.I. CONST. amend. XLII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; S.D. CONST. art.
XXIII, §§ 1, 3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art.
XXIII, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 72; VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1;
W. VA. art. XIV, § 2; Wis. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 20, § 1.
28 See Initiative & Referendum Inst. at Univ. S. Cal., What is I & R?, http://www.iandr
institute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%2OWhat%20is%20I&R.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). By
contrast, a referendum is a process that allows the legislature to propose legislation to the
voters for them to accept or reject. Id.
29 See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII,
§§ 1, 4; COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1; Mo. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2(a),
2(b); MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 45;
OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV, § 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, art. XVII, §§ 1, 2; S.D. CONST. art.
XXIII, §§ 1, 3; UTAH CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1.
30 See ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. VII; CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8,
10, art. XVIII, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 5; ILL. CONST. art.
XIV, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ 50, 51; MONT. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 9; NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 4; NEV. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 2, 4; N.D. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-10;
OHIO CONST. art. II, §§ 1(a), 1(b); OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 3; OR. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 2-4;
S.D. CoNST. art. XXIII, §§ 1, 3.
31 See ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. X, § 4; MASS. CONST. amend, art.
XLVIII, part IV, §§ 1-5, part V, §§ 1-2; MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 1; OHIo CONST. art. XVI, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1;
WYO. CONST. XX, § 1.
32 The Indirect Constitutional Initiative states are Massachusetts and Mississippi. See
MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII; Miss. CONST. art. XV, § 273.
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Figure 1.2: Summary of Direct Democracy Processes 33
A- Popular Referenda-Citizens have the power to refer, by collecting
signatures on a petition, specific legislation that was already enacted
by their legislature to the people to either accept or reject.
B- Statutory Legislative Referenda-Legislators permitted to placed a
statutory proposal before voters for acceptance or rejection.
C- Constitutional Legislative Referenda-Legislators permitted to
place a constitutional change before voters for acceptance or rejection.
D- Direct Statutory Initiative-Citizens may, without any legislative
involvement, place statutory proposals before voters for their accept-
ance or rejection.
E- Indirect Statutory Initiative-Citizens must submit a statutory pro-
posal to the state legislature for its consideration before it can be
placed on the ballot for voter approval or rejection.
F- Direct Constitutional Initiative-Citizens may, without any legisla-
tive involvement, submit a constitutional change to voters for their ac-
ceptance or rejection.
G- Indirect Constitutional Initiative-Citizens must submit a constitu-
tional change to the state legislature for its consideration before it can
be placed on the ballot for voter approval or rejection.
B. DATA INFORMED SPECULATION: THE CURRENT TRENDS IN
AMERICAN DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Much of the recent legal and social scientific literature on the state
of American Direct Democracy directs attention to the aggregate in-
crease in the use of citizen initiatives. 34 While Part L.A describes how
four differentiable and discrete processes fall within the larger family of
initiatives, Part I.B reviews the recent trends in citizen-directed lawmak-
ing with direct reference to the use and electoral success of these initia-
tive sub-categories. This disaggregation demonstrates that within
jurisdictions featuring the Direct Constitutional Initiative [F], there have
been dramatic increases in the appeal of this particular lawmaking pro-
cess in recent years. For these states, the recent surge of American Di-
rect Democracy should substantially be characterized as a constitutional
phenomenon.
33 Definitions drawn from the I & R Institute. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. at Univ.
S. Cal., What is I & R?, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%2What%20is%
201&R.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
34 See, e.g., MATSUSAKA, supra note 20, at 6; M. Dane Waters, People Power: Initiative
and Referendum in the United States, in DEMOCRACY: How DIRECT?: VIEws FROM THE
FOUNDING ERA AND THE POLLING ERA 101 (Elliott Abrams ed., 2002); M. Dane Waters,
Trends in State Initiatives and Referenda, in THE BOOK OF STATES (2002).
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1. Use Across Direct Democracy's Respective Processes
Part L.A asserts an expansive definition of Direct Democracy-one
that encompasses the entire host of referenda and initiative style
processes. While the ultimate focus of this article is the sixteen Direct
Constitutional Initiative (DCI) jurisdictions, it is still worthwhile to con-
sider the position of these jurisdictions relative to other jurisdictions and
citizen-involved lawmaking vehicles. Figure 1.3, drawn from forty-nine
states, depicts the relative distribution of lawmaking attributable to each
direct democratic lawmaking process. As states have different combina-
tions of available processes, this type of global aggregation should be
viewed with caution. For example, as mentioned earlier, virtually every
state features the Constitutional Legislative Referenda. 35 Given its wide-
spread availability, it is not surprising that its uptake dominates all other
processes.
Figure 1.3: The Distribution of Direct Democratic Ballot Measures
1977-2006 (49 States) 36
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In contrast to Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4 displays the relative frequency
of each particular direct democratic process over the past three decades,
within the DCI jurisdictions. 37 Similar to Figure 1.3, the Constitutional
Legislative Referendum [C] far outpaced any competing lawmaking pro-
cess. It is important, however, not to place undue weight upon such ag-
gregate longitudinal data. Specifically, the relative share of change
35 For list of "CLR States," see supra note 27.
36 Id. These charts include tallies for all states except Delaware.
37 For list of "DCI States," see supra note 30.
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undertaken pursuant to the Direct Constitutional Initiative [F] increased
rapidly while the corresponding use of the Constitutional Legislative
Referendum declined steadily. 38
Figure 1.4: The Distribution of Direct Democratic Ballot Measures
1977-2006 (16 DCI States) 39
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
A- Popular B-Statutory C- D-Direct E-Indirect F-Direct G-Indirect
Referenda Legislative Constitutional Statutory Statutory Constitutional Constitutional
Referenda Legislative Initiative Initiative Initiative Initiative
Referenda
E Total Use of the Selected Process 1977-2006 (16 DCI States)
2. The Direct Statutory Initiative and Direct Constitutional
Initiative
A substantial portion of the Direct Democracy literature focuses on
recent aggregate increases in the use of citizen initiatives.40 This trend is
compelling for a variety of reasons. Most notably, direct democracy in
its most "direct" form reflects a divergence from the general American
lawmaking apparatus because it contemplates no role for legislative
authorities.
As depicted in Figure 1.1 four separate processes fall under the gen-
eral heading of citizen initiative. The division of these available initia-
tive mechanisms reveals longitudinal trends. Specifically, when
consideration is restricted to the sixteen states that provide for the Direct
Constitutional Initiative [F], the data demonstrate that this process far
outpaces the complementary statutory process. Figure 1.5 highlights this
38 While the Constitutional Legislative Referendum [C] historically dominates all other
lawmaking methods, Figure 1.6 infra demonstrates how the past decades have witnessed the
steady decline in the use of this process. Simultaneously, Figure 1.6 infra demonstrates how
use of the Direct Constitutional Initiative has nearly doubled.
39 For a list of the sixteen states featuring the Direct Constitutional Initiative, see supra
note 30.
40 For a small share of this larger literature, see supra note 34.
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point, comparing within the sixteen relevant states, the proposal and pas-
sage rates for the Direct Constitutional [F] and Direct Statutory [D] Ini-
tiatives. While Figure 1.4 demonstrates that these processes have
relatively equal historical totals, the use of the Direct Constitutional Initi-
ative nearly doubled while the trend-line accompanying the statutory
process remained far more consistent in recent years.
Figure 1.5: Comparing the Direct Statutory and Direct Constitutional
Initiative Within the 16 DCI States4'
Direct Statutory Initiative
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Direct Constitutional Initiative
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3. Constitutional Legislative Referendum and the Direct
Constitutional Initiative
Over the past few decades, the Direct Constitutional Initiative not
only outpaced its statutory counterpart but also played an increasing role
41 To create comparable graphics, the Direct Statutory Initiative graphic is slightly
smaller than the Direct Constitutional Initiative graphic. These comparisons are drawn within
the sixteen jurisdictions which feature the Direct Constitutional Initiative.
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in driving constitutional change.42 Namely, within jurisdictions that pro-
vide for both the Constitutional Legislative Referendum [C] and the Di-
rect Constitutional Initiative [F], the latter process steadily increased
while the use of the former mechanism steadily declined. Figure 1.6
displays, in longitudinal format, how use of the Constitutional Legisla-
tive Referendum has been cut in half while the frequency of the Direct
Constitutional Initiative has nearly doubled.
Figure 1.6: Comparing the Constitutional Amendment Processes
Within the 16 DCI States43
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42 See Figure 1.6 infra.
43 This comparison is drawn within the sixteen jurisdictions which feature the Direct
Constitutional Initiative. For a listing of states using the Direct Constitutional Initiative, see
supra note 30.
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It is possible the depicted decline in the use of the Constitutional
Legislative Referendum is some artifact of the data binning process. To
assuage such concerns, consider Figure 1.7 which depicts the longitudi-
nal use of the Constitutional Legislative Referenda in the thirty-three
Non-DCI states. In these states, the Constitutional Legislative Referenda
is essentially the only mechanism to amend the state's constitution.44
Confining the analysis to these thirty-three states, Figure 1.7 mirrors the
trend displayed in Figure 1.6. Thus, while there may be other omitted
variables this analysis does not capture, taken together, these graphics
indicate that the Direct Constitutional Initiative amplifies the amount of
constitutional change in a number of American states.
Figure 1.7: The Use of the Constitutional Legislative Referendum
in Non-DCI States45
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Where available, the Direct Constitutional Initiative is quickly be-
coming the method of choice for citizen lawmakers. Its rate of increase
far outpaces any alternative statutory or constitutional lawmaking pro-
cess, such as the Direct Statutory Initiative or the Constitutional Legisla-
tive Referendum. The increasing advent of state constitutional change,
undertaken pursuant to this particular process, requires a review of the
exact nature of the incentive structure that encourages this empirical
trend. It is this specific question that is confronted in Part II of this
article.
44 This statement should be slightly qualified. In a number of these thirty-three states, it
is possible to call for a constitutional convention. For a discussion of revision by convention,
see generally Benjamin, supra note 1I, at 191-200.
45 The thirty-three non-DCI States tallied in Figure 1.7 reflect the states of union minus
the DCI sixteen states and Delaware.
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II. THE MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF AN EMPIRICAL TREND: A
COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE DIRECT
CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE PROCESS
The path between the proposal of a Direct Constitutional Initiative
and a change in the institutional form involves a series of procedural
stages set forth below in Figure 2.1. In order to be successful, a potential
proposer, seeking directly to change a constitution, must navigate a par-
ticular policy offering from inception to final approval. While Figure 2.1
depicts the basic mechanism, the specific nature of each jurisdiction's
process varies at each of the stages described below.
Figure 2.1: The Path from Proposal to Passage>Judicial r
Stage 1 Constitutional Administrative , Circulation Title
Pre-Circulation Offering Pre-Review and Summary(if Applicable)
Stage 2 Official Ballot Signature
Signature Title and Summary Collection
Collection
Stage 3 Constitutional Voter Approval
Voter Approval Change
A. FROM PROPOSAL TO PASSAGE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE
PROCESS
Stage 1: Out of the Starting Blocks: The Pre-Circulation Period
Whether a statutory or constitutional initiative, the process begins
with an individual citizen or interest group devising a particular policy
change. Proposers typically must submit the offering to an authorized
state official for pre-circulation review. 46 Thus, the secretary of state,
attorney general, or some other authorized individual provides a first-
order level of review designed to filter out unmeritorious policy offerings
such as those which might violate the single subject rule, contain incon-
sistent or ambiguous language, or violate the federal Constitution. 47 The
46 See, e.g., Collins & Oesterle, supra note 19, at 93-99; John Cooper, The Citizen Initia-
tive Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous
Component of Participatory Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227, 241 (1998);
Ellis, supra note 22, at 35; Douglas Michael, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional
Amendments, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 461 (1980).
47 Many states that authorize most direct forms of direct democracy also impose the
limitation that proposals embrace a single subject. For an excellent survey of these rules, see
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intensity of this pre-review differs across jurisdictions as some regimes
only allow officials to provide advisory recommendations while others
allow for the wholesale rejection of certain proposals. 48
Assuming a proposal passes the initial threshold, it must next obtain
a circulation title and summary through a process dictated by state law.49
Across the respective jurisdictions, some states allow the proponents of a
given measure to draft the caption and summary while others require this
caption and summary to be crafted by a designated state officer.50 The
language of the circulation title and summary should be considered sig-
nificant because voters use this basic information when determining
whether to provide a signature to the given proposal. 51 Because of its
importance, disputes regarding the nature of the title and summary can
arise.52 In response, a number of states provide for expedited judicial
review of all title and caption related matters. 53
Stage 2: Garnering Threshold Support: The Signature Collection Period
Once the title and summary are established, the process next re-
quires the proponent of a given constitutional change to make a threshold
showing of public support in order to see their particularized reform ef-
fort placed before voters. While the uniform method of this demonstra-
tion is the collection of signatures, the specific requirements vary across
Rachael Downey et al., A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as Applied to Statewide Initiatives,
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2004). For a description of the relationship between the
single subject rule and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, see Robert D. Cooter & Michael D.
Gilbert, Chaos, Direct Democracy, and the Single Subject Rule, AM. L. & EcON. Ass'N ANN.
MEETING (Apr. 28, 2006), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi ?article= I 849&context=
alea; Thad Kousser & Mathew McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives and Policymak-
ing by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (2005). For a critique of the use of the
single subject rule, see Richard L. Hasen, Ending Court Protection of Voters from the Initia-
tive Process, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 117 (2006), http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/
71 .pdf.
48 For example, the Florida Constitution directs that:
[T]he attorney general shall, as directed by general law, request the opinion of the
justices of the supreme court as to the validity of any initiative petition circulated
pursuant to Section 3 of Article XI. The justices shall, subject to their rules of proce-
dure, permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented and shall
render their written opinion no later than April 1 of the year in which the initiative is
to be submitted to the voters pursuant to Section 5 of Article XI.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions do not permit such pre-review.
For a complete listing, see M. DANE WATERS, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 15
(2003).
49 William Lund, What's in a Name? The Battle Over Ballot Titles in Oregon, 34 Wil-
lamette L. Rev. 143 (1998).
50 Id.
51 See Part III.C.1 infra; see also ELLIS, supra note 22, at 71-90; Michael Kang, Democ-
ratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Dis-
closure Plus," 50 UCLA L. REv. 1141 (2003); Lund, supra note 49.
52 See Lund, supra note 49.
53 WATERS, supra note 48, at 16-17.
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jurisdictions. Table 2.1 outlines the signature requirements for the subset
of states that provide for the Direct Constitutional Initiative. Even a cur-
sory review of this table demonstrates interstate variance in not only the
percentage of signatures but also the pool from which the requisite num-
ber is chosen. For example, compare North Dakota, which uniquely
chooses to require a proposer to collect signatures of 4% of the jurisdic-
tions total population, with states such as Arizona and Oklahoma, each of
which demand 15% of the total votes cast for governor in the last guber-
natorial election. Between these extremities lie states such as California,
Illinois, Missouri, and Oregon, all of whom display a rule requiring 8%
of the total votes cast for governor in the last election. Many other states
feature similar percentages but peg their thresholds to the total number of
votes cast in the most recent presidential election, secretary of state's
contest, or general election.
In addition to the thresholds, Table 2.1 also describes the variety of
geographical distribution requirements across the respective states.
While half of jurisdictions forego any distributional requirements, the
balance of the sixteen states featuring the Direct Constitutional Initiative
impose some form of geographic limitation. States are evenly divided
regarding the appropriate unit against which to peg their limitations as
they either require the support of minimal number of counties or Con-
gressional districts.
Finally, the table highlights the major time restrictions imposed
upon signature gatherers. These include the total time allocated for sig-
nature collection as well as the deadline for submission of signatures.
Like all other elements of the analysis, states significantly vary in their
regulation of this question. For example, South Dakota requires signa-
ture submissions one year prior to election day while many other states
impose a mere 90-day deadline. Similarly, consider Arkansas and
Oklahoma, which impose vastly different circulation periods with the
former providing an unlimited collection period while the latter allows a
90-day collection window.
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Table 2.1: Direct Constitutional Initiative Signature Requirements 54
Circulation
Number of Period for
Signatures for Geographic Deadline for Constitutional
STATE Constitutions Distribution Submission Amendments
Arizona 15% of total None 4 Months Prior 20 Months
votes cast for to Election
governor
Arkansas 10% of total 5% in 15 of 75 4 Months Prior Unlimited
votes cast for counties to Election
governor
California 8% of total votes None No Later than 150 Days
cast for governor 131 Days Prior
Colorado 5% of total votes None 3 month Prior to 6 months
cast for sec'y of Election
state
Florida 8% of total votes 8% in 12 of 23 90 Days Prior to 4 Years
cast for President of Cong. Election
Districts
Illinois 8% of total votes None 6 months Prior 24 months
cast for governor to Election
Michigan 10% of total None 120 Days Prior 180 Days
votes cast for to Election
governor
Missouri 8% of total votes 8% in 2/3 of the 8 Months Prior 16 Months
cast for governor Cong. Districts to Election
Montana 10% of total 10% Required in Second Friday of I Year
votes cast for 'h of the Fourth Month
governor Counties Prior to Election
Nebraska 10% of total 10% Must 4 Months Prior I Year
votes cast for Include 5% in
governor 2/5 of the
Counties
Nevada 10% of total 10% of, 3/4 of 90 Days Prior I months
votes cast in last the Counties
general election
North 4% of total state None 90 Days Prior I Year
Dakota population
Ohio 10% of total 5% in 1/2 of the 90 Days Prior I Year
votes cast for Counties
governor
Oklahoma 15% of total None 8 Months Prior 90 Days
votes cast for
governor
Oregon 8% of total votes None 4 Month Prior Unlimited
cast for governor
South 10% of total None I Year Prior 1 Year
Dakota votes cast for
governor
54 This table is compiled from JOHN DINAN, THE BOOK OF STATES 11-13 (2006);
WATERS, supra note 48, at 28-29.
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While the signature thresholds typically fall within a fairly narrow
range, the raw number of signatures required varies quite dramatically.
Table 2.2 displays estimates of the actual signatures required to propose
a Direct Constitutional Initiative and a Direct Statutory Initiative in each
respective DCI state. It then compares those thresholds to the levels re-
quired to offer the Direct Statutory Initiative. A review of this table
highlights how most jurisdictions, which feature both statutory and con-
stitutional initiative processes, only marginally differentiate their respec-
tive signature requirements. At the extreme, Colorado, for example,
imposes identical signature requirements.
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Table 2.2: Comparing the Constitutional & Statutory
Initiative Signature Requirements 55
Number of Number of
Signatures for 2002 Estimated Signatures for 2002 Estimated
STATE Constitutions Number Statutes Number
Arizona 15% of total 152,643 10% of total 101,762
votes cast for votes cast for
governor governor
Arkansas 10% of total 70,602 8% of total votes 54,481
votes cast for cast for governor
governor
California 8% of total votes 670,816 5% of total votes 419,094
cast for governor cast for governor
Colorado 5% of total votes 80,571 5% of total votes 80,571
cast for sec'y of cast for sec'y of
state state
Florida 8% of total votes 488,722 Not Permitted N/A
cast for President
Illinois 8% of total votes 280,000 Not Permitted N/A
cast for governor
Michigan 10% of total 302,710 8% of total votes 242,169
votes cast for cast for governor
governor
Missouri 8% of total votes 120,571 5% of total votes 73,356
cast for governor cast for governor
Montana 10% of total 41,019 5% of total votes 20,500
votes cast for cast for governor
governor
Nebraska 10% of total 108,500 7% of total votes 76,000
votes cast for cast for governor
governor
Nevada 10% of total 61,366 10% of total 61,366
votes cast in last votes cast in last
general election general election
North 4% of total state 25,552 2% of total state 12,776
Dakota population population
Ohio 10% of total 334,624 6% of total votes 200,774
votes cast for cast for governor
governor
Oklahoma 15% of total 185,135 8% of total votes 98,739
votes cast for cast for governor
governor
Oregon 8% of total votes 89,048 6% of total votes 66,786
cast for governor cast for governor
South 10% of total 26,019 5% of total votes 13,010
Dakota votes cast for cast for governor
governor I
55 This table is compiled from WATERS, supra note 48, at 21.
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Stage 3: Taking It to the People: Voter Approval
Whether proposed by legislative authorities or through a citizen ini-
tiative mechanism, the ultimate ratification of a Constitutional Amend-
ment is a power exclusively reserved to the people of the respective state.
Therefore, Table 2.3 below features the ratification rules for each of the
sixteen states that feature the Direct Constitutional Initiative as well as
the two jurisdictions that provide the Indirect Constitutional Initiative.
Table 2.3 demonstrates that most of these states embrace the simple
majority vote. Some jurisdictions, however, employ slightly different
rules. For example, Massachusetts and Mississippi, the two states that
feature the Indirect Constitutional Amendment mechanism, require not
only majority support but also demand that a given proposal receive a
certain percentage of votes cast in the election.56 Similarly, although a
Direct Constitutional Amendment jurisdiction, Nebraska punishes un-
dervotes by requiring that constitutional initiatives receive both majority
support as well as 35% of the total votes cast in the election. 57
Nevada displays the most unusual method of ratification by holding
that a constitutional change offered through the direct amendment pro-
cess must receive majority support in two consecutive general elec-
tions. 58 In contrast, beyond its general majority ratification requirement,
Oregon law contains an important caveat requiring any proposal institut-
ing a supermajority requirement be approved by the same threshold it
seeks prospectively to apply. 59 As such, Oregon law seeks to avoid an
outcome similar to that displayed in Florida during the 2006 election
cycle. There, Florida voters adopted, with 58% support, a supermajority
requirement holding that all subsequent constitutional amendments must
receive 60% support.60
56 See WATERS, supra note 48, at 21.
57 Id.
58 NEv. CONST. art. 19, § 2.
59 See generally Nesbitt v. Myers, 978 P.2d 378, 378-79 (Or. 1999) ("In the 1998 gen-
eral election, voters approved Ballot Measure 63. That measure amended the Oregon Consti-
tution to require that, in all future elections for initiated or referred measures, '[a]ny measure
that includes any proposed requirement for more than a majority of votes cast by the electorate
to approve any change in law or government action shall become effective only if approved by
at least the same percentage of voters specified in the proposed voting requirement.' ").
60 Constitutional Amendment Number 3 passed by 57.8% of voters in the 2006 cycle:
[Amends] Section 5 of Article XI of the State Constitution to require that any pro-
posed amendment to or revision of the State Constitution, whether proposed by the
Legislature, by initiative, or by any other method, must be approved by at least 60
percent of the voters of the state voting on the measure, rather than by a simple
majority. This proposed amendment does not change the current requirement that a
proposed constitutional amendment imposing a new state tax or fee be approved by
at least 2/3 percent of the voters of the state voting in the election in which such an
amendment is considered.
FL. DEP'T OF STATE Div. OF ELECTIONS, PROPOSED CONSTrruTIONAL AMENDMENTS TO BE
VOTED ON NOVEMBER 7, 2006, at 4-5, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/pdf/2006-prop-
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Table 2.3: Ratification Requirements for the
Direct Constitutional Initiative 61
STATE Vote Required for Ratification of an Amendment
Arizona Majority
Arkansas Majority
California Majority
Colorado Majority
Florida 60%
Illinois Majority of those voting in the election or 3/5 voting on
amendment
Massachusetts Majority and 30% of total votes cast in the election
Michigan Majority
Mississippi Majority and 40% of total votes cast in the election
Missouri Majority
Montana Majority
Nebraska Majority and 40% of total votes cast in the election
Nevada Majority in two consecutive general elections
North Dakota Majority
Ohio Majority
Oklahoma Majority
Oregon Majority
South Dakota Majority
An aggregate review of the preceding tables demonstrates that sig-
nificant inter-jurisdictional variance exists with respect to the Direct
Constitutional Initiative process. The same, however, cannot be said
when an intra-jurisdictional comparison of the Direct Constitutional Initi-
ative and Direct Statutory Initiative is entertained. Simply put, within a
given state, there is an overwhelming similarity between these two direct
lawmaking mechanisms. With the exception of the signature thresholds,
the intrastate differences in the balance of these processes, from proposal
to passage, are relatively negligible. Specifically, in every jurisdiction
featuring both the Constitutional and Statutory Initiative processes, the
pre-review method for certifying the title, caption, and summary, as well
as comparable thresholds for ultimate voter ratification, are exceedingly
similar.
consti amend.pdf; Florida Dep't of State, Elections Results, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elec-
tions/resultsarchive/index.asp?ElectionDate=ll 7/2006 (then select "Const. Amendments"
from "Select Office" drop-down box) (last visited Feb. 16, 2008);
61 This table is compiled from DtNAN, supra note 54, 13 (2006); WATERS, supra note 48,
at 26.
2008]
318 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:295
B. THE DIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE VERSUS
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE REFERENDUM
Since each jurisdiction that features the Direct Constitutional Initia-
tive mechanism also features the Constitutional Legislative Referendum,
the process accompanying this alternative Constitution-making vehicle
also must be comparatively considered. Within these jurisdictions and
across the two proposal methods, the ratification mechanism is consis-
tent, as voters ultimately pass on the fate of a given proposal. At the
same time, and by definition, the proposers, as well as the costs they
face, vary significantly.
Table 2.4 below sets forth the thresholds for legislative proposal
within the sixteen states that feature the Direct Constitutional Initiative.
The table displays a host of states who impose supermajority require-
ments, with several jurisdictions requiring votes of at least two-thirds of
the legislature. Montana goes even further by requiring both a
supermajority as well as bicameral support prior to the placement of a
proposal on the ballot.
To further the comparative consideration of these mechanisms, Ta-
ble 2.4 juxtaposes the signature thresholds against the thresholds for leg-
islative vote. In reviewing these requirements, a systematic relationship
between them does not readily appear. Specifically, many states that im-
pose relatively stringent thresholds upon one process do not impose such
exacting standards upon the competing processes. Colorado requires a
stringent two-thirds vote of the legislature, but in turn asks those advo-
cating a Direct Constitutional Initiative to obtain the signatures equal to
5% of those who voted in the last secretary of state's race. By contrast,
Oklahoma requires a mere majority legislative vote but imposes a signifi-
cant 15% signature requirement. Nevada crafts a 10% signature thresh-
old but then imposes a significant constraint by requiring votes of two
consecutive sessions of the state legislature prior to placement of a con-
stitutional amendment upon the ballot.62
62 This is similar to the double majority requirement it imposes on proposals offered
through the Direct Constitutional Initiative. Yet, it is worth noting this particular requirement
is related not to-ratification but merely the proposal of the given offering.
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Table 2.4: Comparing the Thresholds for Proposal of a
Constitutional Change63
Consideration
Legislative Vote by Multiple Number of Signatures for
STATE for Proposal Sessions Constitutions
Arizona Majority No 15% of total votes cast for
governor
Arkansas Majority No 10% of total votes cast for
governor
California 2/3 No 8% of total votes cast for governor
Colorado 2/3 No 5% of total votes cast for sec'y of
state
Florida 3/5 No 8% of total votes cast for President
Illinois 3/5 No 8% of total votes cast for governor
Michigan 2/3 No 10% of total votes cast for
governor
Missouri Majority No 8% of total votes cast for governor
Montana 2/3 (both houses) No 10% of total votes cast for
governor
Nebraska 3/5 No 10% of total votes cast for
governor
Nevada Majority Yes 10% of total votes cast in last
general election
North Majority No 4% of total state population
Dakota
Ohio 3/5 No 10% of total votes cast for
governor
Oklahoma Majority No 15% of total votes cast for
governor
Oregon Majority 2/3 to No 8% of total votes cast for governor
Revise
South Majority No 10% of total votes cast for
Dakota governor
Considering the incentive structure set forth herein, it is hardly sur-
prising that participants in direct democracy are increasingly drawn to
the Direct Constitutional Initiative. The institutional rules displayed
across the selected jurisdictions support the dual empirical findings of
stagnation in the use of the Direct Statutory Initiative and decline in up-
take of the Constitutional Legislative Referendum. Specifically, a re-
view of Tables 2.1-2.3 shows that many states offer identical statutory
and constitutional proposal thresholds. At the same time, there are sig-
63 This table is compiled from JoHN DINAN, supra note 54, at 11-13; WATERS, supra
note 48, at 28-29.
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nificant benefits to proposers for employing constitutional change. 64 As
demonstrated by Table 2.4, in a number of jurisdictions, the prospect for
proposal of any Constitution Legislative Referendum is stymied by
supermajority or other heightened thresholds. This leaves the Direct
Constitutional Initiative as the most viable option for lasting substantive
change.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECT DEMOCRACY
MEETS ITS CRITICS
Part III considers the attractiveness of the institutional forms driving
the empirical trends uncovered and explored in earlier portions of the
article. It begins by considering work by a host of prominent legal com-
mentators, many of whom raise concerns regarding the ability of courts
to police direct democracy and in particular constitutional direct democ-
racy. Given the unease about the efficacy of oversight and with an un-
derstanding that constitutions are sticky and may prove difficult to
unwind once adopted, this Part develops a set of procedural mechanisms
aimed to increase the probability that initial modifications of state consti-
tutions are, in fact, robustly supported.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
What role should the courts play in interpreting ballot measures?
Legal scholars have debated the question of differential treatment-
whether courts should take a "hard look" 65 at direct democratic initia-
tives that they would not employ for legislation passed by a deliberative
body. The late Professor Julian Eule argued that courts should look more
closely when the voters enact a law without a complementary legislative
action, particularly where minority interests are implicated.66 His fa-
mous "hard judicial look theory" suggests a more aggressive approach to
judicial review for this set of direct democratic measures.67 Professor
Eule asserts that it is unlikely that state courts will rule that popular en-
actments, either statutory or amendatory, violate existing state constitu-
tions.68 Professor Eule finds it especially unlikely that searching review
will occur in the sixteen states that are the focus of this article-where
constitutions can be amended directly without legislative review or
64 Most notably, as will be discussed infra in Part HIA, use of the constitutional process
amendment may severely limits the ability of judicial actors or the legislature to subsequently
nullify the decisions reached by the voting majority.
65 Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. 1503, 1558
(1990).
66 Id. at 1558-73.
67 Id. at 1545-47.
68 Id.
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veto.69 According to Eule, in these sixteen states, "sovereignty truly
vests in an electoral majority."' 70 Since state courts, particularly in those
sixteen states, will likely defer to the voters, federal courts step into the
role of actively arbitrating democratically-enacted laws.7'
Other scholars have attempted to create rules for interpreting demo-
cratically enacted measures. In her study of state court decisions from
1984 and 1994 concerning the interpretation of legislative initiatives,
Professor Schacter focuses on the difficulty of courts determining popu-
lar "intent. ' 72 Ultimately, she argues for a different method-a set of
"metademocratic" rules. These rules guard against two distinct problems
of popular democracy-lack of information by the voters, and inequity
or lack of clarity in the initiative process. 73 To address the information
gap, she proposes liberal rules for amicus participation and intervention.
When the process appears biased or the language confusing, she pro-
poses construing the language narrowly.74
Professor Frickey contends that one should combine Professor
Eule's focus on federal constitutionality and Professor Schacter's focus
on statutory interpretation by relying on a quasi-constitutional interpre-
tive approach. 75 In balancing both popular sovereignty and constitu-
tional values, Professor Frickey imports interpretive canons-i)
avoiding constitutional invalidation, 2) narrowly construing propositions
when there is a conflict with existing law, and 3) paying more attention
to established canons of law (such as the rule of lenity) where direct
democracy is involved. 76
By contrast, Professor Tushnet rejects the notion of "differential
standards of review. '77 He argues that the three reasons proffered for
reviewing direct democracy differently than legislative action-lack of
deliberation, the bifurcated decision (and lack of logrolling), and struc-
69 Id. at 1546.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 1586.
72 Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of 'Popular Intent': Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
73 See id.
74 See id. at 155-59.
75 See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct
Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 510 (1996).
76 See id. at 522-23; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 21, 34-35 (1997) (urging courts to characterize "hard to classify"
popular enactments including constitutional amendments as legislative actions, therefore sub-
ject to legislative modification); Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2748, 2765 (2005) (urging judicial distinction between "different types" of direct
democracy).
77 Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct
Legislation, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 373, 373-75 (1996).
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tural or political concerns-do not support more aggressive judicial
review. 78
A review of the record of state constitutional amendments suggests
state courts and even federal courts are extremely reluctant to invalidate
or narrow amendments that have garnered majority support. The Su-
preme Court declined to invalidate state expressions of direct democracy
as inconsistent with the republican form of government clause in the U.S.
Constitution.79 On occasion, the Court has struck down certain state
constitutional amendments as inconsistent with federal constitutional
provisions. For instance, the Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Su-
preme Court's invalidation of the anti-gay rights amendment on equal
protection grounds. 80 State courts have ruled that constitutional amend-
ments run afoul of other constitutional provisions, including most nota-
bly, the procedural single subject rule. On the Whole, state courts and
even federal courts have hesitated to interfere with "the will of the peo-
ple" as expressed in state constitutional amendments. 81 The limiting
rules suggested by Professors Frickey and Schacter have yet to be
78 See id. at 391; see Garrett, supra note 76, at 31 (noting that a strict textualist approach,
such as that espoused by Justice Scalia, may empower interest groups because, unlike legisla-
tion, there is usually no effort at accommodation or compromise by the drafters).
79 See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
80 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affid, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). But see
Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding similar city
ordinance).
81 Kenneth Miller, The Courts and the Initiative Process, in WATERS, supra note 48, at
459-60. While not distinguishing between constitutional and statutory initiatives, Miller con-
cludes that "courts have given both the initiative process and individual initiatives a large
measure of deference." Id. He notes that there has been some judicial resistance in Oregon
and elsewhere. Id. But see Mads Qvortrup, The Courts and the People: An Essay on Judicial
Review of Initiatives, in THE BATTLE OVER CmZEN LAWMAKING 197, 198-99 (M. Dane Wa-
ters ed., 2001) (drawing on Professor Miller's data, noting that 54% of initiatives in California,
Oregon and Colorado were legally challenged in courts in the 1990s, with 55% of those invali-
dated in whole or in part). Professor Qvortrup notes that initiatives concerning minorities and
political speech were more likely to be invalidated than those involving tax or environmental
protection issues. Id. at 198. For further discussion of the reluctance of courts to intervene,
see also MAGELBY, supra note 16, at 72 (constitutional initiatives more legally secure than
legislative initiatives); K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alter-
native Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1209-10 (1995).
For the debate on interpreting state constitutions independent of the Federal Constitution, see
generally G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998); James Gardner,
Whose Constitution Is It?: Why Federalism and Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1245, 1269 (2005) (state judges should continue to consult federal constitu-
tional law under certain circumstances).
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adopted by any court.8 2 Despite some notable exceptions, 83 courts gen-
erally have avoided entertaining challenges to vague or misleading ballot
initiatives.8 4
More typical are the decisions in recent Michigan state court cases
dealing with constitutional amendments in Michigan. The Michigan
courts required the State Board of Canvassers to authorize petitions for
the so-called Michigan Civil Rights Initiative despite the fact that this
proposed constitutional amendment did not address any of its overlap
with existing constitutional provisions and that there were credible, un-
resolved allegations of fraud in the signature gathering.8 5 When the mat-
ter was brought to federal court, the district court judge declined to
invalidate the petitions despite finding "well-documented acts of fraud
and deception that the defendants, as a matter of fact, have not credibly
denied."' 86 The district court judge further stated:
[T]he state has demonstrated an almost complete institu-
tional indifference to the credible allegations of voter
fraud .... If the institutions established by the People
of Michigan, including the Michigan Courts, Board of
State Canvassers, Secretary of State, Attorney General,
and Bureau of Elections, had taken the allegations of
82 Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the
Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 337 (2003) (finding no published
opinions by any state court utilizing Professor Frickey's or Professor Schacter's interpretive
rules for statutory initiatives). For a very helpful general introduction to judicial review of
direct democracy, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 982-1037 (2d
ed. 2002).
83 See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 22, at 149-51 (describing the Oregon Supreme Court's
rewriting of ballot title in Rooney v. Kulongsk, 902 P. 2d 1143, 322 Ore. 15 (1995)).
84 See, e.g., Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Review
of Initiatives, 32 COLUM, J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 237, 250 (1999) (courts avoid possibility of
abusing judicial discretion in labeling initiatives unconstitutional). Pak particularly criticizes
the en banc Ninth Circuit's approach in Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd
Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1038 (1998) (en
banc panel overturned finding state voters lacked notice and clear understanding of state con-
stitutional amendment imposing lifetime term limit on state legislators, earlier upheld by the
California Supreme Court); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 919 (1992).
85 Michigan Civil Rights Initiative v. Board of State Canvassers, 708 N.W.2d 139,
143-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Board of State
Canvassers, 686 N.W.2d 287, 293-94 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no requirement that
similar existing constitutional provisions must be published in a petition).
86 Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at
*5 (D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006), appeal dismissed as moot 2007, No. 06-2144, U.S. App. LEXIS
20550, (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2007); see Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Election Fraud and the Initia-
tive Process: A Study of the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, 34 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
889 (2007).
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voter fraud seriously, then it is quite possible that this
case would not have come to federal court.
87
In a second example involving a 2004 constitutional amendment
purporting to ban same-sex marriage, 8 8 the state courts declined to clar-
ify the scope of the proposal before the measure was placed on the bal-
lot.8 9 The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the State Board of
Canvassers was required to place the amendment on the ballot, holding
the board lacked authority to consider the legality of the proposal and the
substantive challenge "ripe for review" until after enactment. 90 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that two board members:
[E]xpressed concern that the description of the proposal
did not reflect the fact that it could be interpreted to pro-
hibit the recognition of existing or future domestic part-
nerships between a man and a woman or between a
same-sex couple, or to prohibit health insurers from pro-
viding a plan allowing for benefits to unmarried couples,
either opposite sex or same-sex.9 1
Moreover, the Court noted that an assistant attorney general argued
that clarifying the likely effects in a ballot summary (including court in-
terpretation) would be "fraught with difficulty for the simple reason that
by listing some, you omit others." 92
After the same-sex marriage ban passed, the state courts were asked
to clarify the amendment's meaning with respect to the permissibility of
public employers offering health benefits to domestic partners in Na-
tional Pride at Work v. Governor of Michigan.93 The Court of Appeals
reversed a lower court ruling holding that Michigan's constitutional
amendment precluded the offering of domestic partner health benefits.
94
The Court noted that it stood alone among those states barring same-sex
marriage in finding that it applied to health benefits, but asserted that the
wording in Michigan differed from that in other states. 95 Thus, the
87 See Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61323, at *3.
88 Article 1, section 25 of the Michigan Constitution, as amended in 2004, provides: "To
secure and preserve the benefits or marriage for our society and for future generations of
children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recog-
nized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
89 Citizens for Protection of Marriage v. Board of State Canvassers, 688 N.W.2d 538,
542-43 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
90 Id. at 542.
91 Id. at 541.
92 Id.
93 National Pride at Work v. Governor of Michigan, 732 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. Ct. App.
2007).
94 Id.
95 Id.
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Michigan courts declined to require specificity in the wording of the bal-
lot and then adopted a broad construction of the amendment. 96
These examples illustrate the broader dilemma posed by state con-
stitutional amendments not adequately reviewed, analyzed, or explained
before facing the voters. State courts are particularly unlikely to provide
meaningful substantive judicial review of constitutional amendments, 97
and federal courts generally do not appear eager to adopt any heightened
scrutiny, regardless of the legal commentary.
Although in theory, disgruntled groups could try to overturn adverse
administrative 98 or judicial interpretations of amendments through subse-
quent constitutional initiatives, the costs of such actions will likely dis-
courage most from pursuing this course.99 Namely, in virtually all states,
any constitutional amendment must be ratified through a statewide
vote. 100 Thus, unlike statutory proposals, the legislature cannot unilater-
ally unwind a state constitution provision, even if that provision proves
to be sub-optimal.101 Thus, the aggregate institution must likely depend
on the legislature or an interest group to act as a proposer. It must further
rely upon some third party to pay the costs of collective action necessary
to see a subsequent proposal garner sufficient support. 10 2 Simply put, if
the goal of an institution is to maintain an optimal form, 10 3 the use of the
electoral mechanism to undo a recently adopted constitutional amend-
ment may prove wanting, as some individuals may be unwilling to un-
wind recently adopted constitutional changes. 1°4
96 Id. For examples of such broad readings in other states, see Pam Belluck & Gretchen
Ruethling, 2 Court Rulings Deal Blow to Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at
A8. For an argument against a broad reading of such amendments, see Mark Strasser, State
Marriage Amendments and Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy and Consti-
tution Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQ. 59 (2007) (noting a broad reading exposes these provi-
sions to constitutional attack).
97 See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Govern-
ment": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 34 (1993) (noting that an
initiated constitutional amendment in Oregon does not require judicial review and comparing
that with the legislative process of hearings and review).
98 For an argument that many state initiatives leave significant discretion to government
actors, see ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT
RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 109-10 (2001).
99 See Donovan et al., supra note 22, at 101.
100 As discussed earlier, Delaware reflects a deviation from this trend. See supra note 23.
101 Id.
102 See Donovan et al., supra note 22 (describing the initiative industrial complex).
Third-party supporters are very likely necessary to enable a given proposal gamer majority
support. See id. at 111-14.
103 For the idea underlying optimization, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
104 This concern is related to a concept that social scientists call preference endogenity.
Specifically, voters may, for some period following passage, be unwilling to unwind a recently
enacted proposal regardless of its discovered faults. In other words, the treatment effect of
taking a collective decision creates a status quo bias in subsequent periods. For a notable
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In the sixteen states with the Direct Constitutional Initiative (DCI),
where proposals receive no legislative attention and scant attention by
other bodies and where the electoral mechanism is unlikely to unwind
sub-optimal institutional modifications, it is imperative to look to the ini-
tial moment of constitutional modification and ensure that the existing
procedures operate to resist the adoption of anachronistic proposals. To
motivate the reform of the procedural elements of constitutional direct
democracy suggested in Part III.C, Part III.B will briefly highlight some
of the neo-institutionalist social science literature on constitutions.10 5
B. WHY INSTITUTIONS (INCLUDING CONSTITUTIONS) MATTER
Constitutions have been characterized as a form of organization that
can be generalized and compared to other types of institutions. 10 6 This
broad conception of institutions as an organizing force has been urged by
a variety of scholars.' 07 Economist Douglass North classifies institutions
as "the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction." 10 8
While significant academic literature is focused upon understanding spe-
cific policy choices, the study of institutions is devoted to a consideration
study of preference endogenity in the context of politics, see Elisabeth Gerber & John Jackson,
Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 639 (1993).
105 For a prior attempt to reform the state institute and referendum process, see The Chal-
lenges of Direct Democracy in a Republic, ABA Task Force Report (August 1993) (on file
with author). The report describes the American institute and referendum process and presents
a number of important recommendations, several of which are echoed herein. This report,
however was produced at the beginning of the recent surge in the use of direct democracy, in
particular the use Direct Constitutional Initiative.
106 For a summary of the issues surrounding the conceptualization of constitutions as
institutions, see Stefan Voigt, Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as
Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions, 10 CONST. POL. ECON. 283 (1999).
107 Many different versions of the institutionalist program exist including Historical Insti-
tutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism. For just a
small segment of this larger literature, see, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Institu-
tional Perspectives on Political Institutions, 9 GOVERNANCE 247 (1996); James G. March &
Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AMER.
POL. Sci. REV. 734 (1984); Kenneth Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the
Rational Choice Approach, I J. OF THEORETICAL POL. 131 (1989). The "New-Institutional-
ism" is an approach characterized by social scientists Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel as
"more of a method than a mission." See Daniel Diermeier & Keith Krehbiel, Institutionalism
as a Methodology, 15 J. THEO. POL. 123, 124 (2003) (explaining that empirical testing is part
of the institutionalist agenda). While in many ways similar, some argue that New Institutional-
ism is differentiable from New Institutional Economics (N1E). However, all approaches share
many similar traits. For some prominent work in NIE, see, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institu-
tions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991); Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics,
2 J. THEO. POL. 355 (1990); Oliver E. Williamson, The Institutions of Governance, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 75 (1998).
108 Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence
from the United States, 41 J. OF ECON. Lrr. 7 (2003) (citing NORTH, supra note 2, at 3).
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of the higher-order rule environment that governs those choices. 109 Be-
ginning with their classic work on constitutions, Brennan and Buchanan
describe the process of constitutional creation as the selection among
constraints-constraints that a given community chooses to apply pro-
spectively against itself. 110 Like any byproduct of a political process,
constitutions reflect exchanges between competing perspectives and in-
terests. Nevertheless, these supreme documents define the institutional
landscape through which the balance of the "game is to be played."''
Constitutions are important precisely because they are semi-perma-
nent institutions robustly designed to restrict the current and future do-
main of possibilities. They can promote efficiency by decreasing
transaction costs, reducing uncertainty, and creating mutual expecta-
tions. 11 2 However, like other institutions designed to promote and sus-
tain collective action, constitutions must balance the efficiency created
by their constancy with the need to adapt to changing external circum-
stances. 13 On the spectrum between these competing goals lies the opti-
mal method for institutional change, one that economist Randall
Holcombe described as "clear in theory, but [as] one of the practical
challenges of constitutional design."' 14
Part I of this article documents the increased changes to the higher
order rule environment brought about by the Direct Constitutional Initia-
tive [F]. While this increase could represent a genuine need to adapt to
an ever changing external environment, this article asserts the absence of
any legislative involvement, together with other factors, provides reason
to believe that a significant number of these changes are temporally
driven sub-optimal modifications to the institutional form.' 15 However,
109 James Buchanan describes the distinction between Constitutional Economics and
traditional Economics as follows:
In one sense all of economics is about choice, and about the varying and complex
institutional arrangement within which individuals make choices among alternatives.
In ordinary or orthodox economics, no matter how simple or complex, analysis is
concentrated on choices made within constraints that are, themselves, imposed exog-
enously to the person or persons charged with making the choice.
Buchanan, supra note 2, at 2-3.
1 10 See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON FOR RULES 20 (1986).
'1 Id. (declaring, "[T]he hallmark of the constitutionalist is the categorical distinction he
makes between outcomes generated within defined rules and the rules themselves.").
112 ELINOR OsTRoM, GovERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTIONS OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE Ac-ION 53-54 (1990) ("Rules provide stability of expectations, and efforts to
change rules can rapidly reduce that stability.").
113 See Holcombe, supra note 2; supra note 2 and accompanying text.
114 Holcombe, supra note 2, at 326. But see Besley & Case, supra note 108, at 9 ("The
notion of designing an optimal constitution is tinged with hubris."). This point is well taken;
therefore, this article pursues the far more limited but still challenging task of optimizing the
method of institutional change.
115 Of course, one way to increase the legitimacy of these institutional outputs is to in-
crease the deliberation undertaken prior to their ratification. Professor Gardner thoughtfully
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rather than focusing upon a normative critique of the individual substan-
tive outputs produced by the existing rules governing state institutional
change, the inquiry advanced herein focuses upon remedying the poten-
tial procedural deficits in these existing systems. While optimal proce-
dures do not guarantee the production of optimal institutional forms, the
presence of normatively attractive procedures does help insulate substan-
tive policy outputs from a variety of common critiques.
In all, this Part is exclusively devoted to the task of identifying the
set of existing state practices that, if converged upon, would produce an
optimal method of institutional change.1 6 Thus, this Part motivates the
inquiry by identifying two major as well as several secondary critiques
often lodged at constitutional change and direct democracy. 117 Then, it
offers a set of mechanisms designed to mitigate these critiques.
To preview, commentators often argue voters face an informational
deficit as they make decisions about public policy. 118 In the context of
direct democracy, this lack of information causes individuals to select the
type of institutional outputs individuals would not otherwise select if
they possessed full or proximately complete information about the given
policy choice. Next, existing characteristics in the constitutional direct
democratic process may breed inefficiency by collapsing the distinction
between constitutional and statutory law. Finally, the article confronts
certain secondary challenges, including the claim constitutional direct
democracy does not advance optimal public policy and instead has been
co-opted and used to generate turnout for candidate elections.
argues, "[T]he laws and jurisprudential doctrines structuring American election campaigns are
built around a very different assumption: that the purpose of campaigns is primarily to tabulate
exogenous voter preferences." See James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation? The Self-
Undermining Constitutional Architecture of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFFALO L. REV. 1413,
1481 (2007). While the thrust of the argument primarily focuses on candidate elections, much
of his argument also properly characterizes the current state of initiative and referenda cam-
paigns. Id.
116 While the article argues significant convergence is advisable, it also recognizes that
complete convergence is neither practical nor necessarily desirable. For example, Professor
March argues that institutions must balance search for new, innovate practices with the need to
converge upon the best current institutional practices. Their analysis supports the notion that
complete convergence actually might be globally suboptimal. See March, supra note 2; see
also infra Part IV. Other arguments also counsel against complete convergence. Professor
Tarr, for example, has noted how state constitutions may memorialize desirable elements of
local culture. See TARR, supra note 81.
117 One important concern not explicitly addressed herein is the problem of preference
intensity. Namely, direct democratic elections unlike their legislative counterparts fail to re-
veal how voters trade off various policies. A number of leading scholars confront this question
in their work. See Lynn Baker, Preferences, Priorities and Plebiscites, 13 J. CorEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 317 (2004); Sherman Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L
REV. 434 (1998).
118 See infra note 121 citing some examples of such commentary.
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C. CRITIQUES AND SOLUTIONS TO THE SHORTCOMINGS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECT DEMOCRACY
1. Closing the Information Deficit-and Solving the Democratic
Dilemma?
Democratic political systems are built upon the notion of delega-
tion.119 Citizens delegate responsibility to politicians to exercise author-
ity on their behalf.120 Voters act as their overseers by casting decisions
regarding the retrospective and prospective performance of these elected
officials.' 2' Due to a significant line of survey research demonstrating
widespread voter ignorance, 12 2 many scholars express concern regarding
the effectiveness of this candidate selection process as it relies heavily
upon voters to make informed decisions. 23 A shift of inquiry from can-
didate selection toward a direct democratic process offers little evidence
that citizens possess the sufficient level of substantive information neces-
sary to make a reasoned choice. 124 Thus, succinctly stated, there is sig-
nificant reason for concern regarding the health of democratic
institutions when "the people who are called upon to make reasoned
choices may not be capable of doing S0."125
In an effort to rescue democratic theory, political scientists Arthur
Lupia and Mathew McCubbins describe the conditions under which indi-
viduals with little substantive information can participate as if in-
formed.' 26 Attempting to solve The Democratic Dilemma, they describe
how voters can interpret signals and use heuristics 2 7 to obtain proximate
119 See supra note 22 discussing the delegation and the principal and agent framework.
120 ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 79 (1998).
121 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS
3-62 (1981); G. BINGHAM POWELL, ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY:
MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 7-10 (2000) (arguing majoritiarian political sys-
tems embrace retrospective voting where voters reward or punish politicians for prior
behavior).
122 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120, at 17 (citing Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott
Keeter, Stability and Change in the United States Public Knowledge of Politics, 55 PUB. OPIN.
Q. 583 (1991)); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MAII-ERS (1996); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 262 (1942); Shanto Iyengar, Television News and Citizens' Explanation of
National Affairs, 81 AMER. POL. ScI. REV. 815, 816 (1987).
123 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120, at 1.
124 Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
California Insurance Reform Elections, RR AMER. POL. ScI. REV. 63, 63 (1994) (citing
CRONIN, supra note 19).
125 LUPIA & McCuBBhNS, supra note 120, at 1.
126 Id.
127 A heuristic is a simple, easy "rule of thumb" that individuals use to make decisions.
Such rules typically develop through an adaptive learning process. Consideration of heuristics
is at odds with the set of pure rational choice theories that assume individuals act with com-
plete and perfect information. Notable early work on heuristics was undertaken by Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. This work ultimately earned Kahneman the 2002 Nobel Prize.
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information and guide their decision making process. 28 Among their
host of informative suggestions, they argue institutions should contain
signaling devices to help voters acquire useful substitutes for the substan-
tive knowledge they lack.' 29 Specifically, they encourage institutions to
clarify other people's interests, impose penalties for lying, introduce the
threat of verification, or require costly effort.' 30
It is to this end that this article applies their approach to constitu-
tional direct democracy.131 Namely, institutions should both signal par-
ticipants of their interests and, in the case of constitutional direct
democracy, highlight for voters that they are being asked to change the
state's highest level of law. 132 The following reforms would improve the
information environment so that voters can obtain the proximate data
necessary to ensure they vote consistent with their individual interests. 33
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). For an example of their later work on prospect theory, see Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 313 (1979). Consideration of the role of heuristics in decision formation has
now entered mainstream social science through such subfields as behavioral economics and
political psychology. Recent work in the legal literature also embraces these social sciences
findings. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Kang, supra
note 51; Russel Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
128 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120, at 5-8. To describe the intellectual lineage of
their work, the authors cite prominent work in several subfields of game theory including
games of incomplete information, signaling games and strategic communication models. For
games of incomplete information, see John Harsanyi, Games with Incomplete Information
Played by 'Bayesian' Players I: The Basic Model, 14 MGMT. SCI. 159 (1968). For signaling
games, see JEFFREY S. BANKS, SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1991); Richard Mc-
Kelvey & Peter Ordeshook, Information, Electoral Equilibria and the Democratic Ideal, 48 J.
OF POL. 909 (1986). For examples of strategic communication cited by the authors, see
RANDY CALVERT, MODELS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION IN POLITICS (1986); Joseph Farrell &
Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk with Two Audiences, 79 AMER. ECON REV. 1214 (1989).
129 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120, at 206; see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD
FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 118-20 (1998) (em-
phasizing how more accurate voting follows when voters are provided with a clear description
of the impact of a "yes" vote).
130 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120, at 205-27 ("By clarifying other people's inter-
ests, imposing penalties for lying, introducing the threat of verification, or requiring costly
effort, institutions enable voters, legislators, and jurors to make more accurate predictions
about the consequences of their actions. Our examination of modem democratic institutions
reveals some of the ways in which existing institutions do (or do not) help democratic princi-
pals mitigate the democratic dilemma.").
131 In an earlier work, Lupia considered a version of the model in the more general con-
text of direct initiatives. See generally Lupia, supra note 124. However, this did not specifi-
cally focus upon the Direct Constitutional Initiative.
132 This argument is consistent with the framework offered by Professors Lupia and Mc-
Cubbins. See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120.
133 This is often termed as voting "competently." See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Law
and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notions, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (1999) (citing
Elisabeth Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct Legislation Elections, in CIT-
ZEN COMPETENCY & DEMOCRATIC INSTrrTUIoNS 147 (Stephen Elkins & KorI Soltan eds.,
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a. The Production of the Circulation Ballot Title and Summary
by State Officials
As identified in Part II, some jurisdictions allow direct democratic
proposers to play substantial roles in crafting of the circulation title and
summary. 134 In fact, a significant number of states even provide for pro-
poser involvement preparing language for the final ballot. 135 Although
the actual empirical implications have not been fully theorized, there is
reason for concern because the proposer of a given change has an incen-
tive to manipulate the language of the ballot and introduce noise into the
electoral marketplace.' 36 For instance, in the past electoral cycle, a fed-
eral district court found systematic voter fraud when signature gatherers
for the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (MCRI) were charged with
fraudulently telling voters they were signing a petition supporting affirm-
ative action. 137 This ability to mislead signatories is, in part, a function
of the noisy environment that is created in proposer involvement in craft-
ing of the circulation title and summary.
Noisy signals persist beyond the signature gathering process, in-
fecting the entire ratification process. Specifically, the noisy signals can
cause confusion leading individuals to vote in a manner inconsistent with
their genuine interests or to abstain from the matter altogether for fear of
1999)) (identifying voters as competent "if they cast the same votes they would have cast had
they possessed all available knowledge about the policy consequences of their decision."). For
an empirical study, see, e.g., Richard Lau & David Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 AMER.
POL. Sci. REV. 585 (1997) (finding most voters cast correct votes-the types of votes they
would have cast if they possessed complete information).
134 See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT UNIV. S. CAL., COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE
INITIATIVE PROCESSES, http://iandrinstitute.org/New%201RI%2OWebsite%201nfo/Drop%20
Down%20Boxes/Requirements/A%20Comparison%20of%20Statewide%201&R%20
Processes.pdf [hereinafter COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE INIIATNVE PROCESSES] (while some
states provide for review of the circulation materials by state officials several other states
including Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska and Oklahoma allow proposers to write the
circulation materials).
135 See id. (states include Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Ohio and Oklahoma).
136 See Richard Lau & David Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive
Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AMER. J. POL. Sci. 951 (2001) (the proposers may
select the type of noisy signal that systematically favors passage.); Figure 1.6 supra; sources
cited supra note 38. The 2006 election cycle witnessed a number of confusing ballot mea-
sures. Other jurisdictions grappled with the confusion brought about by "counter-proposals."
For example, Arizona voters were faced by two ballot measures related to smoking. See INm-
ATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT UNIV. S. CAL., BALLOT WATCH: FOCus ON TOBACCO, http://
law.usc.edu/academics/assets/docs/BW2006-4Tobacco.pdf. Ohio featured a similar set of
smoking related proposals. Id. In both instances, the measures, although similarly titled,
called upon voters to consider largely dissimilar measures. Id.
137 See Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, 2006 U.S. Dist. 06-12773, at *29 (E.D.
Mich. 2006) (challenges surrounded Michigan's smoking measures and in addition, an Anti-
Affirmative Action measure, called the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative); see also Benson,
supra note 86 (discussing how litigants argued that the title and summary were intentionally
drafted to mislead voters).
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voting erroneously. The framework offered by Lupia and McCubbins
cautions against allowing the proposers to have a role in title and sum-
mary matters. 138 Namely, these devices are perfectly designed for use as
a heuristic. 39 Although state officials do not always produce these
materials, they are still likely to be relied upon by voters. Applying the
Lupia and McCubbins discourse, we see that voters may believe that the
signal is fully credible because state officials typically face "penalties"
for lying. 140 However, despite appearances, state officials are not the
unfettered authors of these signals. Yet, voters' may be justifiably igno-
rant of this fact and unwittingly assign the title and summary excessive
weight in their decision calculus.
To remedy this potential problem, all states should charge state offi-
cials with the unassisted task of crafting the circulation and the final bal-
lot title and summary. While many states already have this institutional
feature, 14 1 those who do not could improve their signaling environment
by using this practice. 142 To ensure the designated official produces a
relatively neutral description of the proposal, states should provide for
expedited review of those conflicts related to the title and summary of a
constitutional initiative. In this review process, the decision of the offi-
cials should be allotted the type of deference typically afforded to admin-
istrative agency officials.143 While the use of these administrative
procedures does not ensure the end of noise free signaling, such a reform
could reduce claims that noise, rather than the true voter preferences,
produce the outputs of constitutional direct democracy.
b. A Need for Support of a Constitutional Change in Two
Consecutive Elections
Additional institutional signaling mechanisms would also assist in
reducing noise. For example, there should be concern in instances when
signaling mechanisms are called upon to change their state constitutions.
It is quite likely many voters are unaware of the distinction between stat-
utory and constitutional law. Alternatively, even if they are aware, they
could fail to receive a signal in a discrete case. Even in jurisdictions with
138 See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120.
139 See supra note 127 (discussing the role of heuristics in its role in law and economics).
140 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120, at 205.
141 See supra note 134 (complete listing).
142 Id.
143 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(Justice Stevens crafted the Chevron "two-step" test. The second step of this test is particularly
applicable in titles and summaries. In step two, a reviewing court determines whether the
agency's interpretations of a statute are reasonable or permissible. If the interpretation of the
statute is reasonable, then the court grants the agency deference).
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clear ballot language, voters may not recognize they are changing their
state's highest level of law.
The institutional rules displayed by Nevada may offer a possible
solution to this problem.144 Nevada law provides a change to its consti-
tution must be ratified by the majorities in two consecutive general elec-
tions. 145 While this institutional choice mitigates some problems and
exacerbates others, 46 it provides voters with a valuable signal. First,
regardless of whether the voter understands the distinction between the
levels of law, this double majority requirement helps to highlight that the
matter at issue is a significant change. Furthermore, the use of two con-
secutive elections for constitutional changes may allow voters the neces-
sary time to obtain needed information and sort signals. Specifically,
many criticize direct democratic elections for a lack of deliberation. 47
The consideration of a given constitutional change in two consecutive
elections would extend the time for citizens to deliberate, potentially
leading to more reasoned considerations of the matter at issue.
c. Marginal Improvements in Disclosure?
A number of commentators argue that substantial financial disclo-
sure in direct democratic elections could assist voters in their decision
making. 148 This approach seems sensible because information is the
commodity that many voters lack when casting decisions. 49 Specifi-
cally, if voters could obtain substantive or proximate knowledge of the
financial support that is provided to ballot measures, they may be able to
use that information to determine whether they want to support a given
proposal.
The Supreme Court's current campaign finance jurisprudence, how-
ever, has undercut the ability of government in direct democratic elec-
tions to provide information to voters through low cost, accessible
144 See ELLIS, supra note 22, 134-37 (providing a more elaborate discussion of Nevada's
successive majority requirement).
145 NEV. CONST. art. IXX; see supra Table 2.3.
146 This would certainly help maintain the distinction between constitutional and statutory
law. However, it might also serve to increase the incentive to use the constitutional process as
a candidate turnout device.
147 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 120, at 226. See generally I JORGEN
!LABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AcTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (for
more on the deliberation within democracy and perspective on the ideal speech situation).
148 See Kang, supra note 51, at 1166-69; see also BRADLEY SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE
FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001) (providing a strong critique of disclosure in
campaign finance); Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law:
The Future of Campaign Finance Law in the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 665, 669-75 (2003).
149 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing extensive survey research dis-
playing widespread voter ignorance).
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means. 150 For example, Professor Kang notes, "Existing campaign fi-
nance regulations in direct democracy have been inadequate for provid-
ing voters with helpful heuristic cues."' 51 To remedy the existing defects
in voter competence, Professor Kang advocates reconsideration of the
constitutional framework in favor of a "disclosure plus" approach. 152
While the ultimate reconsideration of campaign finance jurispru-
dence may or may not occur, within existing regulations there are ex-
isting state practices that can still assist voters. For example, several
states distribute a voters' guide to its citizens. 153 The booklet contains
information with candidate biographical information and information on
ballot measures. While this article asserts that voters' guides should be
provided by all jurisdictions, it recognizes that these guides are quite
lengthy and may still leave many voters unable to obtain necessary infor-
mation to cast their vote.'5 4 Despite limitations, marginal changes to the
format of the voters' guide could improve the information environment.
In instances where voters are called upon to amend the state's constitu-
tion, state officials should place such matters at the beginning of their
election guides. At the same time, it should place any statutory proposals
at the end of the guide. By placing constitutional amendments before
and statutory proposals after candidate races, voters should receive an
explicit signal-one that assists them in differentiating the complicated
landscape.
d. Upfront Judicial Review-Provides Clear Information on a
Vote's Impact
A stringent form of upfront judicial review might also improve the
informational environment. As noted earlier, judicial officials are typi-
cally reluctant to oppose a measure that has garnered majority support,
particularly when it concerns a change to the state's highest level of
150 See Kang, supra note 51, at 1169-76 (discussing cases like First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 443 U.S. 765 (1978), in which, the Supreme Court, citing an absence of
corruption, permitted less regulation of issue elections than of candidate elections).
151 See Kang, supra note 51, at 1165.
152 Id.
153 For example, Oregon produces an extensive guide. See Voters' Guide for November
7, 2006 General Election, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72006/guide/cover.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2008). This guide contains candidate biographical information and a statement
prepared by the candidate supporting his or her candidacy. See id. In addition, the Oregon
guide provides information on ballot measures including the text of the measure, an explana-
tory statement, a description of the impact of a yes or no vote as well as arguments in favor
and against. Id.; see also California Presidential Primary: Official Voter Information Guide,
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
154 See Kang, supra note 51, at 1167 (citing J. FRED SILVA, THa CALIFORNIA INImATIVE
PROCESS: BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE-RESOURCE MATERIAL FOR THE SPEAKER'S COMMIS-
SION ON THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS 31 (2000)).
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law. 155 Given that the reluctance to oppose majority-supported judicial
action is deeply embedded and unlikely to abate, this article proposes
judicial officers involve themselves prospectively in the constitutional
direct democratic process.
Florida, a state with an above-average number of direct constitu-
tional initiatives, provides for pre-review of constitutional initiatives by
the Florida Supreme Court prior to their placement on the electoral bal-
lot.' 56 Other states also embrace some variant of this technique. 157
However, this pre-review is typically cursory and used to determine
whether the proposal clearly violates the U.S. Constitution. The ap-
proach advocated herein, however, goes further, calling upon each state
to allow its highest court to provide a full advisory opinion of how a
given constitutional change would impact existing state-level constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. Such information might genuinely assist
voters. To maximize accessibility, an executive summary of this advi-
sory opinion could be included in the voters' guide.
Like the other proposals, the use of upfront judicial review does not
ensure that voters will receive the necessary signals. Yet, this feature is
attractive because it helps mitigate a degree of uncertainty by providing
all players involved in the enterprise some understanding of how the ju-
diciary will interpret a given measure. As this is a laborious task, for the
purposes of judicial economy, this article simply advocates interposing
this form of review in the immensely important context of the direct
modification of state constitutions. Taken together with the other afore-
mentioned changes, this reform would improve the probability that any
adopted constitutional changes reflect genuine and robust voter
preferences.
2. Strengthening the Distinction Between Constitutional and
Statutory Law
As previously described, constitutions impose restrictions on the
immediate choices available to a political system's actors. They memo-
rialize higher order rules and operate to resist change driven by temporal
or anachronistic conditions. As Elinor Ostrom explains, constitutions are
designed to create mutual expectations.1 58 Such mutual expectations
cannot be legitimately sustained unless the marginal effort necessary to
change statutory law is differentiated from the level necessary for consti-
tutional change.
155 See supra Part M.A.
156 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
157 See COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE INTmATIVE PROCESSES, supra note 134.
158 See OSTROM, supra note 112.
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Current methods for institutional modification displayed in a num-
ber of states do very little to distinguish between constitutional and statu-
tory modification. As Part II of this article demonstrates, although there
is substantial interstate variance in the nature of direct democratic
processes, within most states there are very few differences between
processes. In virtually every jurisdiction featuring multiple direct
processes, it is almost as easy to modify the constitution as it is to enact
statutory law. The only significant difference is the number of required
signatures. 159 A few modifications to the institutional rules, however,
would help distinguish between the methods for modifying mere statu-
tory law and methods for modifying a state's constitution.
a. Differentiate the Signature Requirements for Constitutional
Change
Opponents of direct democracy have long advocated increasing sig-
nature requirements. 160 This is not surprising because an increase in the
signature requirement increases the cost of a proposal, presumably limit-
ing the total number of direct democratic offerings. 161 Restricting the
general supply of direct democratic proposals is outside the scope of this
article. Instead, this article advocates creating a demarcation in signature
thresholds so that only robustly supported changes to the constitution
enter the electoral marketplace.
As previously discussed, there is evidence that recent constitutional
changes are driven in part by a lax incentive environment-one that im-
poses little differentiation in cost between statutory and constitutional
proposals. It may be tempting to believe that any defective reforms will
be modified once they are discovered. Under current rules in many juris-
dictions, there is only a short period following a statutory proposal's pas-
sage during which it may not be rescinded by the legislature. 162 Thus, in
many instances, if a given statutory measure proves ineffective, it can be
removed or modified through the basic lawmaking process. The same is
159 For a comparison of signature thresholds, see supra Table 2.2.
160 See Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L.
REv. 1191, 1231 (2005) ("[M]any reform proposals seek to make it more difficult to place an
initiative on the ballot. The most common of these is to raise the number of signatures peti-
tioners must gather before they can place their initiative on the ballot."); see also Duoois &
FEENEY, supra note 129, at 74-75.
161 See Hoesly, supra note 160, at 1230-32 (raising the possibility that increased signa-
tures may dissuade proposers while simultaneously acknowledging it might not induce the
desired outcome). It is worth noting that increasing the signature thresholds could have unin-
tended consequences. For example, courts, already reticent to interpose themselves in Consti-
tutional Direct Democracy, might be even more deferential to proposals that have obtained the
heightened signature thresholds.
162 For a basic listing of these rules, see THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC
(2003).
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not true of state constitutional changes because in virtually all instances
they mus. be ratified by voters.
It is this difference that may lock in an inefficient constitutional
arrangement. To avoid this outcome, existing rules should be modified
to produce clearly distinguishable processes that embrace constitutional
changes only when necessary. Thus, to reduce lock in, and help create
mutual expectations, states should differentiate their signature thresholds.
As Table 2.2 demonstrates, several states already embrace this prac-
tice. 163 Oklahoma, for example, provides a model for other states to con-
sider. It requires that the number of signatures equal at least 15% of the
total votes cast in the most recent gubernatorial election. 164 This is
nearly double the 8% required to propose a statutory change. 165 While
there is no guarantee that optimal constitutional reform will result, such
differentiation should increase the probability that proposers who choose
the constitutional vehicle do so for policy reasons. Thus, other jurisdic-
tions should consider following Oklahoma's lead by requiring significant
and clearly distinctive signature thresholds.
b. Supermajority Requirement for Constitutional Change
Like the signature requirements, a number of the opponents of di-
rect democracy often also support increasing the ratification thresholds.
While a number of states feature secondary requirements that target un-
dervotes, virtually every state requires mere majority support to ratify a
constitutional change. Several scholars of constitutional political econ-
omy disagree with the use of majoritarian ratification thresholds. For
example, in his work on constitutional design Professor Cass Sunstein
argues that "[d]eliberative democracies do not respond mechanically to
what a majority currently thinks. They do not take snapshots of public
opinion."' 166 Buchanan and Tullock go further by emphasizing that while
there may be an intrinsic appeal of majority rule, it is "a highly imperfect
mechanism for securing distributive justice."' 167 While these authors do
not reach substantive or procedural conclusions, they do agree that pure
majority rule is not the only calling of democratic politics. Instead, rea-
son and restraint memorialized in sticky constitutional institutions are
also an important motivating dynamic.
163 See supra Table 2.2. Others, most notably Colorado, do not. Colorado requires the
same number of signatures regardless of the level of law at issue.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY 239 (2001).
167 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 2, at 97-116 (focusing primarily on fiscal
questions); see also John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a
Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999) (considering supermajority rules
in the context of the U.S. Constitution).
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These scholars would likely support action taken by voters in Flor-
ida, who in 2006 voted to impose a supermajority requirement upon any
prospective constitutional changes. 168 While this change does not ensure
the provision of optimal public policy, a supermajority requirement
would, like the signature thresholds, help both filter out some range of
anachronistically offered constitutional proposals and differentiate be-
tween levels of rules in the legal hierarchy. Specifically, it might induce
some actors seeking policy change to select the statutory rather than the
constitutional mechanism. States should follow Florida and consider in-
creasing their ratification thresholds for constitutional changes. In partic-
ular, they should impose supermajority requirements upon those
proposals that circumvent the legislature (i.e., the direct constitutional
initiative).
c. Require Support in Two Consecutive Elections for
Constitutional Change
In addition to the signaling benefits previously discussed, the re-
quirement of majority support in two consecutive elections would help
maintain a clear demarcation between statutory and constitutional
changes. Specifically, as noted earlier, given the relatively negligible
differences between the statutory and constitutional modification
processes and the benefits to choosing constitutional change, the aggre-
gate increased use of the direct constitutional initiative might be driven
as much by the existing incentive structure as a genuine need to change
the institutional form.
Nevada's double ratification practice would help sort the supply
function for constitutional offerings. 169 Double ratification would in-
crease the marginal cost of a constitutional proposal helping ensure the
set of constitutional proposals that reach the ballot genuinely necessitate
their constitutional form. At the same time, the double-ratification re-
quirement is not likely to eliminate the possibility of citizen driven con-
stitutional change. 170 Yet, taken together with the differentiation in
signature thresholds and the supermajority requirement, it should demar-
168 In fact, 57.8% choose to impose the 60% threshold. See Florida Dep't of State, Elec-
tions Results, supra note 60. This structure in essence creates a one-way ratchet as it now a
supermajority is required to reinstitute majority rule. Such a change would be impossible in
Oregon because voters, through the 1998 Measure 63, imposed a requirement that "[any mea-
sure that includes any proposed requirement for more than a majority of votes cast by the
electorate to approve any change in law or government action shall become effective only if
approved by at least the same percentage of voters specified in the proposed voting require-
ment." OR. CONST. art. II, § 23.
169 NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2.
170 According to our data, under the double ratification requirement, Nevada has em-
braced a non-trivial number of modifications to its constitution in the past decades.
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cate levels of rules and help prevent states from embracing transitory
modifications.
3. Secondary Critiques of Constitutional Direct Democracy
a. Constitutional Direct Democracy as a Candidate Turnout
Device
Recent popular accounts have posited that the sponsors of a number
of direct democratic proposals are far less interested in advancing opti-
mal public policy than using the process to increase voter turnout in the
simultaneous candidate election. 71 Namely, a set of marginal voters are
thought to be induced to the polls by a given ballot measure and once
present, cast a vote for a particular set of preferred candidates.172 Thus,
political parties or third party interest groups are believed to select pro-
posals that disproportionately draw favorable voters.173 While the theory
appears sound, social scientists, who empirically consider this matter,
reach differing conclusions regarding the extent of this effect. For exam-
ple, early work finds no statistically significant relationship and thus ar-
gues the candidate races alone drive the extent of overall voter
turnout.' 74 Conversely, more recent work finds a conditional relation-
ship between turnout and ballot measures. 75 Namely, the presence of a
ballot measure may induce turnout during midterm elections, where the
candidate races are less attractive and do less to bring voters to the polls.
Actors who strategically seek to use direct democracy, however,
may be less interested in the magnitude of impact than the specific candi-
date races at issue. Specifically, they may be primarily interested in af-
fecting the presidential or other semi-periodic elections. Thus, while this
ongoing empirical debate does not provide complete clarity as to the ap-
propriate remedy to fashion, it does partially inform the policy solution.
171 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, G.O.P. Moves Fast to Reignite Issue of Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at A6.
172 See, e.g., Walter Shapiro, Ohio Churches Hope Marriage Ban Prods Voters to Polls,
USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2004, at 10A.
173 See Stolberg, supra note 171.
174 While journalistic accounts often assert this relationship, there is significant debate in
the social science literature regarding the magnitude of effect that direct democracy imposes
upon voter turnout See David Everson, The Effects of Initiatives on Voter Turnout: A Com-
parative State Analysis, 34 W. POL. Q. 415, 424-25 (1981) (finding no statistically discernible
effect); Franklin Gilliam, Influences on Voter Turnout for U.S. House Elections in Non-Presi-
dential Years, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 339, 344-47 (1985) (finding the presence of a tax referen-
dum on the ballot did not have a discernable impact on voter turnout).
175 The methodology employed in early studies has been challenged by recent work. See,
e.g., Mark Smith, The Contingent Effects of Ballot Initiatives and Candidate Races on Turn-
out, 45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 700, 703-05 (2001) (re-specifying the original model and finding a
relationship between high salience ballot measures and voter turnout in candidate races).
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As has been noted throughout, the primary focus of this article is the
potential embrace of temporally driven but ultimately sub-optimal consti-
tutional changes. In response to this concern, as well as the narrow con-
cern of turnout driven strategic use of the Direct Constitutional Initiative,
states could combine Nevada's double ratification practice together with
the practice of Tennessee, which requires all constitutional changes to be
ratified in the midterm elections. 176 This may reduce part of the strategic
incentive to use the direct democracy processes. Specifically, even if the
impact upon the midterm election is greater, the inability to effect the
presidential elections until the second of the double ratification votes
may induce an interest group or political party to consider a different
approach, other than the Direct Constitutional Initiative, in order to in-
crease voter turnout.
b. Information in the Crowded Market of Direct Democratic
Offerings
The past years' aggregate increase in the use of direct democratic
processes has created a crowded market for direct democratic offerings.
For example, the 2000 general election cycle saw voters reflect upon
more than twenty-five ballot proposals in the state of Oregon. 177 Califor-
nia has also been a leader in direct democratic offerings; in 2004, the
ballot featured more than fifteen total offerings.' 78
Interspersed among these proposals were a significant number of
constitutional changes. For all of the reasons previously discussed, con-
stitutional offerings, in particular those offered without first passing
through any legislative filter, should be of primary concern. However,
the large ticket of total offerings threatens to obscure the significance of
these measures.
This article describes a number of mechanisms that increase the cost
to proposing a constitutional change-presumably limiting the total
number of constitutional offerings. Of course, another way to limit the
number of constitutional changes is merely to restrict the number of con-
stitutional changes. 179 However, this is likely to prove unworkable. The
176 TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3 ("[If] such proposed amendment or amendments shall be
agreed to by two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of
the General Assembly to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people at the
next general election in which a governor is to be chosen." (emphasis added)).
177 See Oregon Blue Book: Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 2000-2006, http://blue
book.state.or.us/state/elections/elections22a.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
178 See Cal. Secretary of State, 2004 Presidential General Election, Statewide Measures
Submitted to a Vote of Voters, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004-general/contents.
htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
179 For a description of such existing limitations, see WATERS, supra note 53, at 20. See
also Benjamin, supra note 11, at 183 (offering a list of states with various limits upon the
number of amendments per session).
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wide number of ballot measures voters' face is derived from multiple
proposers and methods. Limiting the number of ballot offerings to more
manageable numbers would require a widespread limitation reaching all
forms of direct democracy.
As discussed throughout this article, low cost information is the
commodity that voters may need. This is particularly true of issue elec-
tions where financial information is difficult to obtain and proposals do
not come attached with party labels.' 80 In such a clustered ballot, it is
difficult for even the most diligent and motivated individuals to obtain
the proximate, let alone substantive knowledge, necessary to cast a vote
consistent with their interests.
Institutions can help provide low cost informational signals to vot-
ers and as such increase the legitimacy of the collective choice obtained
through a direct democratic process. Instead of imposing per se restric-
tions upon the total number of direct democratic offerings, states could
reorder their electoral ballots in an effort to signal voters of constitutional
changes. 181 Significant work from the social sciences contends that bal-
lot placement may have an impact on political outcomes. 82 Capturing
upon these findings, states should consider placing changes to their con-
stitutions directly after federal elections but before any state-level candi-
date races. Much like the proposal to reorder the voters' .guides
discussed earlier, 183 statutory proposals could then follow the state-level
candidate races. This demarcation would highlight the supreme impor-
tance of the matter at issue and help overcome some of the noise associ-
ated with the crowded market for direct democratic offerings.
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM, BEST PRACTICES, AND
CONVERGENCE: TOWARD AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM
FOR INSTITUTIONAL MODIFICATION
The American federal bargain produces significant state autonomy
over certain policy domains. Each state is fully empowered to make dif-
ferent choices regarding both its substantive policy outputs and the out-
180 See Kang, supra note 50, at 1149-51.
181 Some states already engage in a mild version of this practice. Consider Arizona which
attaches differing numbers (300s, 200s, 100s) to proposals in an effort to signal voters of the
nature of the change in question. Such numbering is required by law. See ARrz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-125(B) (2002).
182 Although typically concerned with the placement of individuals in candidate races, the
literature on ballot order effects provides a lesson applicable to issue races. Compare Jonathan
Koppell & Jennifer Steen, The Effects of Ballot Position on Election Outcomes, 66 J. POL. 267,
268 (2004) (providing a good summary of the candidate-related literature, focusing on the
importance of ballot positioning in election turnouts), with David Brockington, A Low Infor-
mation Theory of Ballot Position Effect, 25 POL. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2003) (concludes the more
information voters have, the less of a role ballot positioning plays).
183 See Part III.B.3 supra.
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put-producing institutions. While devolution need not necessarily
produce divergence, intra-jurisdictional variance is typically found
within a variety of important policy domains. In particular, as demon-
strated herein, there is an extreme lack of uniformity in the rules gov-
erning state constitutional modification. Observing this divergence, it is
tempting to assume devolution causes many jurisdictions to feature sub-
optimal rules. However, federalism also presents an opportunity, which,
if exploited, could yield a more efficient institutional form than would
have resulted in the absence of state control. 184
Permitting devolution and exploration by multiple diverse sub-units
is federalism's promise. 185 Heterogeneous explorers bring unique per-
spectives to the policy making process.' 86 These variant perspectives
can lead to innovative practices through experimentation. 187 In other
words, through search, devolution can lead to higher levels of total utility
than might have been achieved without the commitment to federalism. 88
The key to capturing the benefits of federalism is optimal convergence.
Namely, following the search and discovery of a best practice by one
jurisdiction, it is critical that other jurisdictions using a less successful
policy change their process to mimic their neighbor.
It is to this reform-minded end that this article is committed. Aimed
primarily at the Direct Constitutional Initiative, but with lessons for other
processes, it has identified a set of existing practices that if converged
upon could produce a more reasoned and more efficient process of insti-
tutional change. Since judicial officials seem unwilling or unable to serve
as the referees of constitutional direct democracy, this task of policing
largely falls elsewhere. Reformers, progressive or otherwise, should
strongly consider the proposals advocated herein. Taken together, they
would yield a process of institutional reform that respects state constitu-
tions and treats them as the supreme level of American state law.
184 See, e.g., BEDNAR, supra note 18; Ken Kollman, John H. Miller & Scott E. Page,
Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions, 16 J.L. EcoN. & ORC. 102 (2000).
185 Id.
186 Id.; see also ScoTr PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE (2007) (outlining the conditions under
which a set of heterogeneous individuals can outperform homogeneous problem solvers; these
lessons are potentially applicable to a variety of institutional forms including governments
organized under a hierarchy of federalism).
187 Of course, innovative practices do not always result. Despite the possibility that ex-
perimentation will lead to inefficient practices being selected, the aggregate institution could
still operate quite efficiently. Federal systems need to both exploit the gains from discovered
best practices while still allowing some jurisdictions to search for new innovative policy solu-
tions. For a detailed elaboration of these ideas, see generally BEDNAR, supra note 18. See
also March, supra note 2 (arguing why complete convergence is not ideal).
188 See Kollman, Miller & Page, supra note 184.
